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Conditional Federal Spending as a
Regulatory Device
ALBERT J. ROSENTHAL*
In 1936, the spending power was freed from the constraining
doubt that it might be usable only to implement other enumerated
powers of Congress. In United States v. Butler, decided that year,
the Supreme Court declared that it was a freestanding power to ex-
pend money for the general welfare.1 While the actual holding of the
case was that a major program for farm relief was invalid, that re-
sult was soon bypassed both practically and conceptually.
Today, the federal spending power is an important tool for shaping
our economy, our government, and our society. Debates about our
political agenda turn at least as much on conflicting priorities for
spending as on opposing policies for regulation. Although spending
decisions may generate much political controversy, few constitutional
questions are involved,2 and they are not our concern in this context.
But there is more to the story than that. Government money is not
normally handed out without restrictions. Conditions of one kind or
another have almost always been imposed, at least to make sure that
the money serves the purposes for which it was intended. From this
point, it was a comparatively short step to cross over to the use of
conditions to induce or deter conduct.
In many instances, the conduct could have been constitutionally
controlled anyway, through the direct powers of Congress. For ex-
* Visiting Professor of Law, St. John's University, Maurice T. Moore Professor
Emeritus of Law, Columbia University. This paper is based on a presentation by the
author at a panel discussion sponsored by the Section on Constitutional Law of the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools in New Orleans in January 1989.
1. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
2. For example, spending in aid of religion may give rise to establishment clause
problems, and an increase in the salary of an incumbent president would violate U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
ample, since Congress may legislate to enforce the fourteenth
amendment, it may give financial support to help school systems to
desegregate, or refuse otherwise available funds to those that fail to
do so. In such cases, there is no serious constitutional problem; the
conditional spending can be regarded as a necessary and proper
means for carrying out the regulatory power.
There are situations, however, in which the regulation would not
have been within other powers of Congress, and the necessary-and-
proper justification would not have sufficed. What are the tests for
the constitutionality of conditional spending in those cases? In other
words, in what circumstances may government condition spending so
as to control conduct it could not regulate directly?
An answer of "none" is clearly unacceptable. Much that is salu-
tary, and often uncontroversial, is handled in just that fashion. On
the other hand, an answer of "all" is even more frightening. Such an
answer would threaten compromises that emerged in the Constitu-
tional Convention and doctrines that have evolved over the ensuing
200 years.
To what extent may the federal government bribe or threaten the
states into surrendering some of their inherent powers? Or use
money as a device to coerce individuals into giving up liberties other-
wise protected by the Bill of Rights or other parts of the Constitu-
tion?3 It may well be that these are two separate problem areas, with
few common denominators. There are not many instances in which
the courts have drawn on precedents or analysis applicable to one
area in deciding a case arising in the other. Perhaps different stan-
dards are appropriate.
There does not seem to have been a single case in which condi-
tional federal spending has been declared invalid by the Supreme
Court on the ground that it interfered with state autonomy. While
the Court has several times indicated in dicta that there are limits on
this power,4 it has always found them inapplicable. On the other
hand, although there has been only one Supreme Court case invali-
dating federal conditional spending impinging on individual rights,5
the approach of the Court implies that there will be more careful
scrutiny. Moreover, there are many Supreme Court decisions invali-
dating conditional spending by the states that infringed upon individ-
3. This paper is confined to these two problem areas, thus excluding questions
relating to whether conditional spending may enable Congress (a) to regulate matters not
related to its enumerated powers, or (b) to interfere with the separation of powers among
the branches of the federal government. See Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending
and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1125, 1161 n.253 (1987).
4. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 569 (1974); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590-91 (1937).
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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ual rights.' Where the issue is one of federal intrusion on state au-
tonomy, no analogue in state legislation can arise.
Control experiments as devices for analysis of judicial decision
making are rarely possible. But we can find some illumination by
comparing two cases, each involving one of these two problem areas,
in which two portions of the same statute with related policy goals
were both challenged and both cases were decided on the same day.
A principal purpose of the Hatch Act" was the reduction of parti-
san political activity on the part of government employees. 9 One pro-
vision required the firing of members of the federal civil service who
engaged in certain types of such activity.10 Another provided for re-
ductions of federal highway grants to a state if they were adminis-
tered by an official who was also a political party leader.1 Both pro-
visions were upheld, but on different reasoning. In United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 2 the restrictions on federal employees were
sustained on the basis of balancing the rights of the employees
against the perceived need for insulating the federal service from
partisan activity. 3 But in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,4
upholding the condition on highway grants to the states, no compa-
rable balancing analysis was offered - rather the Court made a curt
comment that seemed only to say that if the state did not like the
condition it need not take the money.' 5
In the Oklahoma case,'" and several times since, the Court has
specifically indicated that some intrusions on state autonomy not
permissible through direct regulation might nevertheless stand up
where they were made as conditions to federal money. For example,
in National League of Cities v. Usery,17 invalidating the application
6. E.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7. State laws interfering with the functioning of the federal government would, of
course, run afoul of the supremacy clause. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1982).
9. See id.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 1506 (1982).
12. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
13. Id. at 96-99.
14. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
15. "Oklahoma adopted the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is
federal coercion." Id. at 143-44 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482
(1923)).
16. Id. at 143.
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state and local gov-
ernment, the majority opinion suggested in a footnote that the same
result would not necessarily follow if adherence to federal minimum
wage and maximum hour rules were made a condition to eligibility
for federal funds."8 In South Dakota v. Dole,'9 the Court upheld a
law that denied some federal highway funds to states that failed to
adopt twenty-one as the minimum age for drinking. 0 Direct federal
regulation of the drinking age might have been barred, despite the
relevance of the commerce power, because of possible home-rule im-
plications of the twenty-first amendment; the Court assumed such
invalidity arguendo, but nevertheless upheld the provision under the
spending power.2'
Perhaps the Court regards the states as strong enough politically
to be able to protect themselves against most federal regulation that
they believe threatens their interests. That premise seems to underlie
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,2 2 which
overruled National League of Cities and revived the authority of
Congress to prescribe minimum wages for state and local govern-
ment employees; Professor Herbert Wechsler's "political safeguards
of federalism" 23 were clearly influential.2 4
It seems likely that the Court regards the states as even more ca-
pable of protecting themselves politically against conditional spend-
ing that infringes on their basic autonomy. Apart from the National
League of Cities footnote,25 there have been a number of cases in
which the Court has affirmed or let stand lower court decisions up-
holding conditional spending that put pressure on the states to do
things that Congress probably could not have compelled through di-
rect regulation.20
We ought, however, to take a fresh look at this apparent assump-
tion of the Court that conditional spending is less of a threat to the
states than is direct regulation. When appropriation of federal
money for the states is under consideration, the lobbying efforts of
states are necessarily directed toward securing such funds, and ob-
taining as much as possible. A diversion of lobbying effort, to pre-
vent the placing of strings on these funds, would often be avoided,
18. Id. at 852 n.17; see also id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 206.
2,2. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
23. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954).
24. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. at 550-52.
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1138-39 & nn.152-60.
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especially if the objection was more a matter of principle than be-
cause of direct and immediate damage to the state's ability to govern
itself. Further empirical evidence is needed to explore whether the
political clout of the states is more or less effective when the issue is
conditional spending rather than direct regulation.
There are other reasons for hesitating to invalidate conditional
federal grants to the states; indeed, in some circumstances we can
conclude that our federalism is served rather than threatened by use
of that device. We have a strong tradition that, with comparatively
rare exceptions, police forces should not be part of the federal estab-
lishment but employees of the state and local governments. Condi-
tional spending gives the federal government a mechanism for ob-
taining obedience to some federal policies without needing federal
police. The fifty-five mile per hour speed limit and twenty-one year
old drinking age are legislated and enforced by the states under
threat of loss of federal highway funds if they fail to comply. Similar
techniques may be effective in enforcing federal environmental
regulations.
There are some other variables that may be relevant. In past peri-
ods of generous federal subsidies to states and localities, such money
constituted a significant fraction of the recipient governments' budg-
ets; threats to cut off the subsidies could be coercive. Now, with
sharp cutbacks in federal grants, it might be thought that the threat
of withholding would be less effective. That may not be true, how-
ever, in the present period of readjustment, with many states them-
selves squeezed into cutting back on important programs. But it
might be questioned whether constitutionality should depend on the
vicissitudes of the fiscal cycle.
When we turn to interferences with individual rights, some other
considerations come into play. The restraints on direct regulation by
the federal government are more specific, and their enforcement is
more frequent. The subordination of powers of Congress other than
the spending power to constitutional restrictions such as those con-
tained in the Bill of Rights is generally quite clear. For example,
Congress may regulate interstate commerce but may not forbid the
interstate transportation of The New York Times. But similar con-
stitutional restraints do not apply as clearly to the spending power.
We may assume that in some circumstances the right to strike is
constitutionally protected; yet, Congress may deny food stamps to
27. See id. at 1135-36 & n.146.
strikers who might otherwise be eligible for them.2"
I have found only one Supreme Court case holding that the condi-
tioning of federal money on the relinquishment of individual rights is
unconstitutional. In Federal Communications Commission v. League
of Women Voters,29 the Court held that Congress could not forbid
radio and television stations that accepted funds from the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting to broadcast editorials. One swallow
may not make a summer, but if we see enough members of other
species of migratory birds we may draw some conclusions. There has
been a steady trickle of cases involving invalidation of state laws that
used the power of the purse to put pressure on the exercise of indi-
vidual rights.30 An example cited frequently, and repeatedly followed
by the Supreme Court, is Sherbert v. Verner,3x in which the Court
held that a state unemployment compensation provision which de-
nied benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on
Saturdays was unconstitutional.
What yardsticks are appropriate for judging the constitutionality
of such statutes? Some decisions have been justified on the ground
that the recipient has consented; others have found such consent viti-
ated by duress. Contract doctrines may be helpful, but should not be
decisive; there are other interests at stake. We would not enforce
even a private contract, free though it might be from duress or
fraud, under which a person sold himself into slavery. The govern-
ment is not, and should not be, as free as private parties to buy con-
sent where public harm may result. It certainly should not have the
options of a private employer to condition its employment contracts
on relinquishment of rights to freedom of speech or religion or on the
submission of employees to unreasonable searches and seizures. 2
But suppose the other party to a contract with the government has
his or her options broadened by entering into it? Where a medical
student's education is paid for by the government in return for a
commitment to spend a certain amount of time after graduation giv-
ing medical care in underserved neighborhoods, the interests of both
the government and the medical student are advanced. Such an
agreement ought not to be invalidated. But suppose, instead, that the
government offers to pay tuition if the student agrees that after
graduation he or she will not - or will - perform abortions. An
opposite result seems indicated; yet, both parties may perceive them-
28. Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); see Epstein, Foreword: Un-
constitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4,
5, 96 (1988).
29. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
30. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32. See Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 76 (1964).
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selves to be better off as a result of the contract.
One factor that might limit the use of agreements that leave both
the government and the other party better off than before is the like-
lihood of externalities - adverse effects upon persons other than the
contracting parties, or upon some general public interest. In this re-
gard, consider the case of Snepp v. United States.33 Central Intelli-
gence Agency employees were required, as a condition of employ-
ment, to agree that they would not, without prior government
approval, publish anything learned in the course of their work. 4
Snepp had been a Central Intelligence Agency operative in Vietnam.
He violated this pledge after leaving the Agency by writing a book
critical of a number of aspects of the Central Intelligence Agency's
activities that he had observed - most dramatically, the abandon-
ment without warning of many Vietnamese who had helped us, when
we departed from Saigon. 5 Although there was no showing that he
had revealed any classified information, the Supreme Court imposed
a constructive trust on his royalties.36 The Court's per curiam opin-
ion, without the benefit of briefs or arguments on the merits, was
based largely on breach of contract. It did not rest primarily on the
government's right to protect its intelligence activities by imposing
such restrictions, 7 which might well have been persuasive.
Here, Snepp had apparently consented to the abridgment of his
first amendment rights. But the right of the public to know about the
government's conduct or misconduct in Vietnam was also cut off.
There was good reason to believe that the subject of Snepp's writing
was of substantial importance to the American public in keeping
them informed about some activities of their government."8 One re-
sult of enforcing such agreements is the drying up of information
needed for public evaluation of government policies and practices -
particularly information of its mistakes and wrongdoing, where the
incentive to cover up is likely to be greatest.
A conclusion that both parties to an agreement are better off than
they would have been without it should be the beginning of the in-
33. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 507-08.
35. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 444
U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
36. 444 U.S. at 515-16.
37. See id.
38. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521.
quiry, not the end.39 Economic efficiency is an appropriate objective
of law, but not necessarily the sole criterion of constitutionality. The
Constitution did not enact Pareto Optimality any more than it en-
acted Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Another problem in measuring who will be better or worse off is
selecting the appropriate baseline. If government pays for all medical
needs of the poor, and then stops paying for the cost of abortions,
some prospective recipients are worse off than before. If government
pays for nothing, and then adopts a program of paying for all medi-
cal costs except those for abortion, nobody is worse off than before.
But it strains common sense to suggest that the boundary line be-
tween constitutionality and unconstitutionality should be drawn be-
tween those two situations.4 0
I have suggested elswhere41 that with respect to individual rights,
there should be a rebuttable presumption that a restriction that
would have been unconstitutional if imposed through direct regula-
tion would also be invalid if generated by conditional spending. This
presumption would not be applicable to a "restriction" that was
merely the purpose of the expenditure itself - for example, the ren-
dition of services as part of an employment contract, or of attend-
ance and performance by the recipient of a university scholarship.
And the presumption would be rebuttable if the net effect was to
increase the recipient's options without any serious adverse effect on
other individuals or society. I have attempted to test this standard
against a number of actual and hypothetical cases, with results that,
not surprisingly, seemed persuasive at least to me.42 But others
should try alternative formulations, and subject them to similar tests,
in the interest of developing a more satisfactory standard.
It should, perhaps, not be surprising that different yardsticks are
employed in determining the validity of conditional spending where
state government autonomy is at stake, than when the issue is one of
individual rights. There appears to be a much stronger argument
that the states are better able to protect themselves through the po-
litical process43 than are the dissenters, minorities, and others who
may comprise a large fraction of those likely to have their individual
rights infringed. There has been a strong theme in American consti-
tutional theory supporting the conclusion that judicial intervention is
more appropriate when political remedies for abuse are not readily
39. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 9-10.
40. See Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359-63 (1984).
41. Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1152-60.
42. Id. at 1156-60.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
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available. 44
If, in fact, conditional spending is a serious and not sufficiently
recognized threat to our constitutional balances, the problem may
also be a growing one. It seems to be so, but I have not undertaken a
count. Perhaps conditional spending is merely being noticed more. In
any event, a partial list of recent uses is interesting.
Federal funding of some highway construction and maintenance
expenses of the states has been a frequent subject of conditions. I
have mentioned an early example - forfeiture of some funds if the
state officials handling the federal money were also political party
leaders.45 Later came an easier case, the fifty-five mile per hour
speed limit. This could probably have been legislated directly under
the commerce power,46 but the federal government was reluctant to
assume direct enforcement responsibility. More recently, we have
had the twenty-one year old drinking age, upheld in South Dakota v.
Dole, discussed above.41 One factor that may explain the ease with
which these restrictions were sustained is that in each case the frac-
tion of federal subsidy at risk was fairly small, suggesting that the
states could have resisted without suffering crippling financial loss if
they really thought their integrity was threatened.48 Another factor
is that, despite the small price of resistance, most states complied
with little grumbling.49 The power to condition is not necessarily the
power to destroy.
Another recent use of the spending power was the conditioning of
federal subsidies to the Long Island Railroad (owned and operated
by a New York state agency) upon its prohibition of smoking in pas-
senger cars.5 Congress has also imposed a condition on federal
grants to the states for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) programs. The states must enact laws prescribing formulas
for child support by divorced or separated parents that conform to a
federal model. 51
44. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Wechsler, supra
note 23.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
46. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
48. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
49. Id.
50. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1987, § II, at 9, col. 1; id., Jan 23, 1988, § I, at 29,
col. 5.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 667 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
The child support regulations relate so significantly to the funding
needs for AFDC that on that ground alone the conditions appear
reasonable, even though they put financial pressure on many states
to alter their own policies drastically. Thus far, there have not been
any challenges to these regulations in court.
The Court in South Dakota v. Dole pointed out the relevance of
the twenty-one year old drinking age to the safety purpose of the
highway spending program, 2 but the link is certainly an attenuated
one. Perhaps a stronger argument was the effect of state-by-state
variations in drinking age on drinking and driving by young people
crossing state boundaries - an externality especially appropriate for
federal intervention.53
We can hardly speak of state autonomy with respect to the Dis-
trict of Columbia; Congress has plenary power to govern the Dis-
trict. But within the last year Congress has, for reasons of its own,
sought to put financial pressure on the government of the District to
adopt laws it didn't want to vote for. Rather than simply enacting
federal statutes overriding disapproved provisions of District law,
Congress used the device of conditioning appropriations for the Dis-
trict on its government's dancing to Congress' music. A cutoff of all
federal appropriations for the District was threatened if its local gov-
ernment did not overturn laws requiring District of Columbia resi-
dence for certain jobs and forbidding insurance companies from re-
quiring AIDS testing for insurance. Although compromises on these
issues were worked out, such a statute was enacted by Congress to
put pressure on the District of Columbia government to overturn a
decision that Georgetown University could not bar gay organizations
from its campus. The City Council challenged the statute, and a fed-
eral district court held it unconstitutional. 4 The decision was not
predicated on autonomy of the District government, but on the de-
nial of first amendment rights to members of the City Council, who
would have preferred to vote against the measure."
The Executive Branch's adoption of conditions seems to have be-
come more frequent in the individual rights area. Such conditions
have repeatedly been imposed without any express congressional
52. 483 U.S. at 208.
53. Id.
The yardstick that I have suggested with respect to individual rights - a rebuttable
presumption that conditional spending may not coerce where direct regulation would be
invalid - is not readily workable in connection with intrusions on state government au-
tonomy, because of the paucity, as baselines, of precedents concerning the validity of
direct federal regulations that have the same effect. Moreover, the Court has stated quite
strongly that in this area the fact that direct regulation would be invalid is not especially
significant. See id. at 212.
54. Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605 (D. D.C. 1988), affid, 886 F.2d 204
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 609-10.
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command, and sometimes where even implied authority is dubious.
In 1984, the Reagan Administration announced a new policy deny-
ing family planning grants, under the foreign aid program, to health
service providers and similar agencies that performed, gave referrals,
or even provided neutral advice concerning abortions. 6 This prohibi-
tion specifically applied to potential recipients that used funds de-
rived from other sources for these purposes. A federal district court
decision that these restrictions were unconstitutional has been re-
versed on appeal. 57
This regulation was followed soon after by a similar, although less
stringent, restriction on funds for family planning within the United
States5" (held unconstitutional by two of the three district courts
that have considered it),59 and by amendments to the Adolescent
Family Life Act of 1981 that used selective funding to discourage
any references to abortion in youth counseling programs.6 Also, the
Legal Services Corporation recently adopted a regulation refusing
federal funds to local legal aid organizations that, again even though
using only nongovernment money, engaged in several types of in-
structional programs and grass-roots lobbying seemingly protected
by the first amendment.6 1 This regulation was overturned by Con-
56. See Policy -Statement of the United States of America at the United Nations
International Conference on Population, 2d Sess., Mexico City, Aug. 6-13, 1984; Rosen-
thal, International Population Policy and the Constitution, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
301 (1977).
57. DKT Memorial Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.
D.C. 1988), rev'd, Nos. 88-5243, 88-5266 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989
W.L. 118764). A number of analogous state laws had earlier been invalidated. Planned
Parenthood v. Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.), a.fd sub nom. Babbitt v. Planned
Parenthood, 479 U.S. 925 (1986); Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v.
Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see also Planned Parenthood v. Minne-
sota, 612 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.), afid, 448 U.S. 901 (1980); Valley Family Planning v.
North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238 (D.N.D. 1980), a fd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 99
(8th Cir. 1981). These precedents are vulnerable to any overruling or sharp curtailment
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988).
59. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo.
1988) (order granting preliminary injunction); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1988); Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137
(D. Mass. 1988), en banc reh'g granted, No. 88-1279 (1st Cir. Aug. 9, 1989). Contra
New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y.1988), a~fd sub nom. New York v.
Sullivan, No. 88-6204 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 W.L. 131669).
60. 42 U.S.C. 300z to 300z-10 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see Hirt, Why the Govern-
ment is Not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1895 (1988); Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion
Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916 (1988).
61. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,539 (1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 28,434 (1987).
gress at the instance of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee . 2
CONCLUSION
This subject has not been receiving scholarly or judicial attention
commensurate with its importance. I hope satisfactory principles can
be formulated, by which to separate valid from invalid conditions. It
will not be enough for such constructs to reflect some overriding po-
litical or economic philosophy, or to be merely internally consistent.
Any theory ought to be tested against such case law as there is (al-
though a proponent is of course not obliged to agree with the cases
or tailor his or her theory to conform to them). More importantly, it
should be tested against a wide range of hypothetical cases to ensure
that it would be likely to conform to, rather than undercut, our con-
stitutional system.
62. Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-33.
